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Abstract
This paper investigates optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under
Epstein-Zin preferences. Given consumption and healthcare spending plans, Epstein-Zin utili-
ties are defined over an agent’s random lifetime, partially controllable by the agent as healthcare
reduces Gompertz’ natural growth rate of mortality. In a Black-Scholes market, the stochastic
optimization problem is solved through the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion. Compared with classical Epstein-Zin utility maximization, the additional controlled mor-
tality process complicates the uniqueness of Epstein-Zin utilities and verification arguments. A
combination of probabilistic arguments and analysis of the HJB equation are required to resolve
the challenges. In contrast to prior work under time-separable utilities, Epstein-Zin preferences
largely facilitate calibration. In four different countries we examined, the model-generated mor-
tality closely approximates actual mortality data; moreover, the calibrated efficacy of healthcare
is in broad agreement with empirical studies on healthcare across countries.
MSC (2010): 91G10, 93E20.
JEL: G11, I12
Keywords: Consumption-investment problem, Healthcare, Mortality, Gompertz’ law, Epstein-
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1 Introduction
Mortality, the probability that someone alive today dies next year, exhibits an approximate expo-
nential growth with age, an observation made by Gompertz [12] in the early 19th century. Despite
the steady decline of mortality at all age groups across different generations, the exponential growth
of mortality within each generation has remained remarkably stable, which is called the Gompertz
law. Figure 1 displays this clearly: in the US, mortality of the cohort born in 1900 (blue dots)
and that of the cohort born in 1940 (red dots) grew exponentially at a similar rate; the latter is
essentially shifted down from the former.1
At the intuitive level, the steady decline of mortality across generations can be ascribed to the
continuous improvement of healthcare and accumulation of wealth. Understanding the precise rela-
tions among healthcare, wealth, and mortality demands a general model in which wealth evolution,
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1Similar pattern is observed in various countries, as displayed in Figure 3.
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Figure 1: Mortality rates (vertical axis, in logarithmic scale) at adults’ ages for the cohorts born in
1900 and 1940 in the US. The dots are actual mortality data (Source: Berkeley Human Mortality
Database), and the lines are model-implied mortality curves.
healthcare choices, and the resulting mortality are all endogenous. Standard models of optimal
consumption and investment do not seem to serve the purpose: the majority, e.g. [37], [25], [26],
and [31], consider no more than exogenous mortality, leaving no room for healthcare.2
Recently, Guasoni and Huang [14] directly modeled the effect of healthcare on mortality: health-
care reduces Gompertz’ natural growth rate of mortality, through an efficacy function that char-
acterizes the effect of healthcare spending in a society. Healthcare, as a result, indirectly increases
utility from consumption accumulated over a longer lifetime. Under the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function U(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ , 0 < γ < 1, an optimal strategy of consumption,
investment, and healthcare spending is derived in [14], where the constraint 0 < γ < 1 is justified by
interpreting 1/γ as an agent’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Specifically, to model
mortality endogenously, we need to be cautious of potential preference for death over life. To avoid
this, [14] assumes that an agent can leave a fraction ζ ∈ (0, 1], not necessarily all, of his wealth
at death to beneficiaries, reflecting the effect of inheritance and estate taxes. It is shown in [14]
that the optimization problem is ill-posed for γ > 1. Indeed, with γ > 1, or EIS less than one,
the income effect of future loss of wealth at death is so substantial that the agent reduces current
consumption to zero, leading to the ill-posedness; see below [14, Proposition 3.2] for details.
Despite the progress in [14], the artificial relation that EIS is the reciprocal of relative risk
aversion, forced by CRRA utility functions, significantly restricts its applications. Although a
preliminary calibration was carried out in [14, Section 5], it was not based on the full-fledged model
in [14], but a simplified version without any risky asset. Indeed, once a risky asset is considered, it
is unclear whether γ should be calibrated to relative risk aversion or EIS. More crucially, empirical
studies largely reject relative risk aversion and EIS being reciprocals to each other: it is widely
2As an exception, the literature on health capital, initiated by [13], considers endogenous healthcare. Despite
its lasting development towards more realistic models (see e.g. [10], [9], [38], [18], and [15]), the Gompertz law of
mortality remains largely absent.
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accepted that EIS is larger than one (see e.g. [3], [2], [6], and [5]), while numerous estimates of
relative risk aversion are also larger than one (see e.g. [34], [3], and [16]).
In this paper, we investigate optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under
preferences of Epstein-Zin type, which disentangle relative risk aversion (denoted by 0 < γ 6= 1)
and EIS (denoted by ψ > 0). In particular, we assume throughout the paper
ψ > 1 and γ > 1/ψ, (1.1)
which implies a preference for early resolution of uncertainty (as explained in [32]), and conforms
to empirical estimations mentioned above.
Our Epstein-Zin utility process has several distinctive features. First, it is defined on a random
horizon τ , the death time of an agent. Prior studies on Epstein-Zin utilities focus on a fixed-time
horizon; see e.g. [8], [28], [22], [30], [21], and [36]. To the best our knowledge, random-horizon
Epstein-Zin utilities are developed for the first time in Aurand and Huang [1], where the horizon
is assumed to be a stopping time adapted to the market filtration. Our studies complement [1], by
allowing for a stopping time (i.e. the death time) that need not depend on the financial market.
Second, the random horizon τ is controllable: one slows the growth of mortality via healthcare
spending, which in turn changes the distribution of τ . Note that a controllable random horizon
is rarely discussed in stochastic control, even under time-separable utilities. Third, to formulate
our Epstein-Zin utilities, we need not only a given consumption stream c (as in the literature),
but also a specified healthcare spending process h. Given the pair (c, h), the Epstein-Zin utility is
defined as the right-continuous process V˜ c,h that satisfies a random-horizon dynamics (i.e. (2.6)
below), with a jump at time τ . Thanks to techniques of filtration expansion, we decompose V˜ c,h as
a function of τ and a process V c,h that solves an infinite-horizon backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE) under solely the market filtration; see Proposition 2.1. That is, the randomness
from death and from the market can be dealt with separately. By deriving a comparison result for
this infinite-horizon BSDE (Proposition 2.2), we are able to uniquely determine the Epstein-Zin
utility V˜ c,h for any k-admissible strategy (c, h) (Definition 2.3); see Theorem 2.1.
In a Black-Scholes financial market, we maximize the time-0 Epstein-Zin utility V˜ c,h0 over per-
missible strategies (c, pi, h) of consumption, investment, and healthcare spending (Definition 4.2).
First, we derive the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, from which a candidate
optimal strategy (c∗, pi∗, h∗) can be deduced. Taking advantage of a scaling property of the HJB
equation, we reduce it to a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE), for which a unique
classical solution exists on strength of the Perron method construction in [14]. This, together with
a general verification theorem (Theorem 3.1), yields the optimality of (c∗, pi∗, h∗); see Theorem 4.1,
the major result of this paper.
Compared with classical Epstein-Zin utility maximization, the additional controlled mortality
process Mh in our case adds nontrivial complexity. In deriving the comparison result Proposi-
tion 2.2, standard Gronwall’s inequality cannot be applied due to the inclusion of Mh. As shown
in Appendix A.2, a transformation of processes, as well as the use of both forward and backward
Gronwall’s inequalities, are required to circumvent this issue. On the other hand, in carrying out
verification arguments, we need to contain the growth of Mh properly to ensure that the Epstein-Zin
utility is well-defined. This is done through a combination of probabilistic arguments and analysis
of the aforementioned nonlinear ODE; see Appendix B.2 for details.
Our model is calibrated to mortality data in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria.
There are three intriguing findings. First, our model-implied mortality closely approximates the
actual mortality data. Under the simplifying assumptions that the cohort born in 1900 had no
healthcare and the cohort born in 1940 had full access to healthcare, we use our model to generate
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an endogenous mortality curve for the 1940 cohort. Figure 1 shows that the model-implied mortality
(the red line) essentially reproduces actual data (the red dots). Our model performs well for not
only the US data, but those from other countries as well; see Figure 3. Second, as shown in Figure
2, the calibrated efficacy functions of healthcare (one for each country) indicate a ranking in terms
of the effectiveness of healthcare spending: across realistic levels of spending, healthcare is more
effective in the Netherlands than in the UK, in the UK than in the US, and in the US than in
Bulgaria. This ranking, somewhat surprisingly, is in broad agreement with empirical studies on
healthcare across countries; see Section 5.3. Third, healthcare spendings in these four countries all
increase steadily with age, relative to both total wealth and total spending, but differ markedly in
magnitude; see Figure 4. This, together with the ranking of efficacy in Figure 2, reveals that higher
efficacy of healthcare induces lower healthcare spending.
Figure 2: Calibrated efficacy of healthcare g(h), measured by the reduction in the growth of
mortality, given proportions of wealth h spent on healthcare in different countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes Epstein-Zin utilities over
one’s random lifetime, with healthcare spending incorporated. Section 3 introduces the problem
of optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending under Epstein-Zin preferences, and
derives the related HJB equation and a general verification theorem. Section 4 presents the main
results in order of complexity, characterizing optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare
spending in three different settings of aging and access to healthcare. Section 5 calibrates our
model to mortality data in four countries, and discusses important implications. Most proofs are
collected in Appendices.
2 Epstein-Zin Preferences with Healthcare Spending
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 that satisfies the usual
conditions. Consider another probability space (Ω′,F ′,P′) supporting a random variable Z that
has an exponential law
P′(Z > z) = e−z, z ≥ 0. (2.1)
We denote by (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯) the product probability space (Ω × Ω′,F × F ′,P × P′). The expectations
taken under P, P′, and P¯ will be denoted by E, E′, and E¯, respectively.
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Consider an agent who obtains utility from consumption, partially determines his lifespan
through healthcare spending, and has bequest motives to leave his wealth at death to beneficiaries.
Specifically, we assume that the mortality rate process M of the agent evolves as
dMt = (β − g(ht))Mtdt, M0 = m > 0, (2.2)
where h = (ht)t≥0, a nonnegative F-progressively measurable process, represents the proportion
of wealth spent on healthcare at each time t, while g : R+ → R+ is the efficacy function that
prescribes how much the natural growth rate of mortality β > 0 is reduced by healthcare spending
ht. For any ω¯ = (ω, ω
′) ∈ Ω¯, the random lifetime of the agent is formulated as
τ(ω¯) := inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
Mhs (ω)ds ≥ Z(ω′)
}
. (2.3)
The information available to the agent is then defined as G = (Gt)t≥0 with
Gt := Ft ∨Ht, where Ht := σ
(
1{τ≤u}, u ∈ [0, t]
)
. (2.4)
That is, at any time t, the agent knows the information contained in Ft and whether he is still
alive (i.e. whether τ > t holds); he has no further information of τ , as the random variable Z is
inaccessible to him. Finally, we assume that the agent can leave a fraction ζ ∈ (0, 1], not necessarily
all, of his wealth at death to beneficiaries, reflecting the effect of inheritance and estate taxes.
Remark 2.1. The controlled mortality (2.2), introduced by Guasoni and Huang [14], is based on the
assumption that healthcare expenses affect mortality growth relative to wealth rather than in absolute
terms. While this is a modeling simplification, there are empirical and theoretical justifications for
it; see [14, p.319] for details.
Now, let us define a non-standard Epstein-Zin utility process that incorporates healthcare spend-
ing. First, recall the Epstein-Zin aggregator f : R+ × R→ R given by
f(c, v) := δ
(1− γ)v
1− 1ψ
((
c
((1− γ)v) 11−γ
)1− 1
ψ
− 1
)
= δ
c
1− 1
ψ
1− 1ψ
(
(1− γ)v)1− 1θ − δθv, with θ := 1− γ
1− 1ψ
,
(2.5)
where γ and ψ represent the agent’s relative risk aversion and EIS, respectively, as stated in
Section 1. Given a consumption stream c = (ct)t≥0, assumed to be nonnegative F-progressively
measurable, and a healthcare spending process h = (ht)t≥0 introduced below (2.2), we define the
Epstein-Zin utility on the random horizon τ to be a G-adapted semimartingale (V˜ c,ht )t≥0 satisfying
V˜ c,ht = E¯t
[∫ T∧τ
t∧τ
f(cs, V˜
c,h
s )ds+ ζ
1−γ V˜ c,hτ− 1{τ≤T} + V˜
c,h
T 1{τ>T}
]
, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞, (2.6)
where we use the notation E¯t [·] = E¯ [·|Gt]. In (2.6), we assert that the loss of wealth at death results
in a decreased bequest utility, by a factor of ζ1−γ . This assertion will be made clear and justified
in Section 4, where a financial model is in place; see Remark 4.3 particularly.
To solve (2.6) for the process V˜ c,h, let us first introduce a general formulation of infinite-horizon
BSDEs that will be used throughout the paper.
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Definition 2.1. Let V be an F-progressively measurable process satisfying E[sups∈[0,t] |Vs|] <∞ for
all t ≥ 0. For any G : Ω× R+ × R → R such that
(
G(·, t, Vt(·))
)
t≥0 is F-progressively measurable,
we say V is a solution to the infinite-horizon BSDE
dVt = −G(ω, t, Vt)dt+ dMt, (2.7)
if for any T > 0 there exists an F-martingale (Mt)t∈[0,T ] such that (2.7) holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.2. Without a terminal condition, (2.7) can have infinitely many solutions. Indeed, as
long as G admits proper monotonicity, there are solutions to (2.7) that satisfy “limt→∞ Vt = ξ for
F-measurable random variable ξ” or “limt→∞ E
[
eρtVt
] → 0 for ρ > 0”; see [7] and [11]. We will
address this non-uniqueness issue by enforcing appropriate “terminal behavior”; see Remark 2.5.
The next result shows that the G-adapted V˜ in (2.6) can be expressed as a function of τ and
an F-adapted process V that satisfies an infinite-horizon BSDE.
Proposition 2.1. Let c, h be nonegative F-progressively measurable and V˜ be a G-adapted semi-
martingale, with E¯[sups∈[0,t] |V˜s|] <∞ for all t ≥ 0, that satisfies (2.6). Then,
V˜t = Vt1{t<τ} + ζ1−γVτ−1{t≥τ} ∀t ≥ 0, (2.8)
where V is an F-adapted semimartingale, with E[sups∈[0,t] |Vs|] <∞ for all t ≥ 0, that satisfies the
infinite-horizon BSDE
dVt = −F (ct,Mht , Vt)ds+ dMt, (2.9)
with F : R+ × R+ × R→ R defined by
F (c,m, v) := f(c, v)− (1− ζ1−γ)mv. (2.10)
Proof. See Section A.1.
In view of Proposition 2.1, to uniquely determine the Epstein-Zin utility process V˜ , we need to
find a suitable class of stochastic processes among which there exists a unique solution to (2.9). To
this end, we start with imposing appropriate integrability and transversality conditions.
Definition 2.2. For any k ∈ R, define Λ := δθ+(1−θ)k. Then, for any nonnegative F-progressively
measurable h, we denote by Ehk the set of all F-adapted semimartingales Y that satisfy the following
integrability and transversality conditions:
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Ys|
]
<∞ ∀t > 0 and lim
t→∞ e
−ΛtE
[
e
−γ(ψ−1) 1−ζ1−γ
1−γ
∫ t
0 M
h
s ds|Yt|
]
= 0. (2.11)
Remark 2.3. Condition (2.11) is similar to [23, (2.3)], but the controlled mortality Mh in our case
complicates the transversality condition: unlike [23, (2.3)], the exponential term no longer contains
a constant rate, but a stochastic one involving Mh. This adds nontrivial complexity to deriving a
comparison result (Proposition 2.2) and the use of verification arguments (Theorem 4.1).
Remark 2.4. The constant Λ := δθ+ (1− θ)k in (2.11) can be negative, even when k > 0 (as will
be assumed in Section 4). In such a case, (2.11) stipulates that Mh must increase fast enough to
neutralize the growth of e−Λt, such that the transversality condition can be satisfied.
We now introduce the appropriate collection of strategies (c, h) we will focus on.
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Definition 2.3. Let c, h be nonnegative F-progressively measurable. For any k ∈ R, we say (c, h)
is k-admissible if there exists V ∈ Ehk satisfying (2.9) and
Vs ≤ δθ
(
k + (ψ − 1)1− ζ
1−γ
1− γ M
h
s
)−θ
c1−γs
1− γ , ∀s ≥ 0. (2.12)
Remark 2.5. Condition (2.12) is the key to a comparison result for (2.9), as shown in Proposi-
tion 2.2 below. In a sense, (2.11)-(2.12) is the enforced “terminal behavior”, under which a solution
to (2.7) can be uniquely identified. Technically, (2.12) is similar to typical conditions imposed for
infinite-horizon BSDEs, such as [7, (H1’)] and the one in [11, Theorem 5.1]: all of them require
the solution to be bounded from above by a tractable process. Moreover, for classical Epstein-Zin
utilities (without healthcare), a similar condition was imposed in [23, (2.5)]. In fact, Definition 2.3
is in line with [23, Definition 2.1], but adapted to include the controlled mortality Mh.
A comparison result for BSDE (2.9) can now be established.
Proposition 2.2. Let k ∈ R and c, h be nonnegative F-progressively measurable processes. Suppose
that V 1 ∈ Ehk is a solution to (2.9) and V 2 ∈ Ehk is a solution to (2.7). If V 1 satisfies (2.12) and
F (ct,Mt, V
2
t ) ≤ G(t, V 2t ) dP× dt-a.e., then V 1t ≤ V 2t for t ≥ 0 P-a.s.
Proof. See Section A.2.
The next result is a direct consequence of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Theorem 2.1. Fix k ∈ R. For any k-adimissible (c, h), there exists a unique solution V c,h ∈ Ehk to
(2.9) that satisfies (2.12). Hence, the Epstein-Zin utility V˜ c,h can be uniquely determined via (2.8).
3 Problem Formulation
Let B = (Bt)t≥0 be an F-adapted standard Brownian motion. Consider a financial market with a
riskfree rate r > 0 and a risky asset St given by
dSt = (µ+ r)Stdt+ σStdBt, (3.1)
where µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are given constants. Given initial wealth x > 0, at each time t ≥ 0, an
agent consumes a lump-sum ct of his wealth, invests a fraction pit of his wealth on the risky asset,
and spends another fraction ht on healthcare. The resulting dynamics of the wealth process X is
dXt = Xt (r + µpit − ht) dt− ctdt+XtσpitdBt, X0 = x. (3.2)
Definition 3.1. For all k ∈ R, let Hk be the set of strategies (c, pi, h) such that (c, h) is k-admissible
(Definition 2.3), pi is F-progressively measurable, and a unique solution Xc,pi,h to (3.2) exists.
The agent aims to maximize his lifetime Epstein-Zin utility V˜ c,h0 by choosing (c, pi, h) in a
suitable collection of strategies P, i.e.
sup
(c,pi,h)∈P
V˜ c,h0 = sup
(c,pi,h)∈P
V c,h0 , (3.3)
where the equality follows from (2.8). In this section, we only require P to satisfy
P ⊆ Hk for some k ∈ R. (3.4)
A more precise definition of P, depending on the specification of β, γ, and ζ, will be introduced
in Definition 4.2 below. The focus of this section is to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for (3.3) and establish a versatile verification theorem under the general condition (3.4).
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3.1 A General Verification Theorem
Under the current Markovian setting (i.e. (3.1) and (3.2)), we take
v(x,m) := sup
(c,pi,h)∈P
V c,h0 . (3.5)
Namely, the optimal value should be a function of the current wealth and mortality. The relation
(A.10), derived from (2.6), suggests the following dynamic programming principle (DPP): With
the shorthand notation p = (c, pi, h) and ps = (cs, pis, hs) for s ≥ 0, for any T > 0,
v(x,m) =
sup
p∈P
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, v(X
p
s ,M
h
s )) + ζ
1−γMhs v(X
p
s ,M
h
s )
)
ds+ e−
∫ T
0 Msdsv(XpT ,M
h
T )
]
. (3.6)
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−
∫ t
0 M
h
s dsv(Xpt ,M
h
t ), assuming enough regularity of v, we get
e−
∫ T
0 M
h
s dsv(XpT ,M
h
T )− v(x,m)
=
∫ T
0
(
Lps [v](Xpt ,M
h
t )dt−Mht v(Xpt ,Mht )
)
dt+
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 M
h
s dsσpiXpt vx(X
p
t ,M
h
t )dBt,
where the operator La,b,d[·] is defined by
La,b,d[κ](x,m) := ((r + µb− d)x− a)κx(x,m) + (β − g(d))mκm(x,m) + 1
2
σ2b2x2κxx(x,m), (3.7)
for any κ ∈ C2,1(R+ × R+). We can then rewrite (3.6) as
0 = sup
p∈P
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 M
h
t dt
(
f(cs, v(X
p
s ,M
h
s ))ds+ (ζ
1−γ − 1)Mhs v(Xps ,Mhs ) + Lps [v](Xps ,Mhs )
)
ds
]
.
The HJB equation associated with v(x,m) is then
0 = sup
c∈R+
{f(c, w(x,m))− cwx(x,m)}+ sup
h∈R+
{−g(h)mwm(x,m)− hxwx(x,m)}
+ sup
pi∈R
{
µpixwx(x,m) +
1
2
σ2pi2x2wxx(x,m)
}
(3.8)
+ rxwx(x,m) + βmwm(x,m) + (ζ
1−γ − 1)mw(x,m), ∀(x,m) ∈ R2+.
Equivalently, this can be written in the more compact form
sup
c,h∈R+,pi∈R
{
Lc,pi,h[w](x,m) + f(c, w(x,m))
}
+ (ζ1−γ − 1)mw(x,m) = 0, ∀(x,m) ∈ R2+. (3.9)
We establish a general verification theorem for v(x,m) in (3.5).
Theorem 3.1. Let w ∈ C2,1(R+ × R+) be a solution to (3.8), and P satisfy (3.4). Suppose that
for any (c, pi, h) ∈ P, the process w(Xc,pi,ht ,Mht ), t ≥ 0, belongs to Ehk (where k ∈ R is specified by
(3.4)) and
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
pisX
c,pi,h
s wx(X
c,pi,h
s ,M
h
s )
]
<∞, ∀t > 0. (3.10)
Then, the following holds.
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(i) w(x,m) ≥ v(x,m) on R+ × R+.
(ii) Suppose further that there exist Borel measurable functions c¯, p¯i, h¯ : R2+ → R such that c¯(x,m),
p¯i(x,m), and h¯(x,m) are maximizers of
sup
c∈R+
{f(c, w(x,m))− cwx(x,m)} , sup
pi∈R
{
µpixwx(x,m) +
1
2
σ2pi2x2wxx(x,m)
}
, (3.11)
sup
h∈R+
{−g(h)mwm(x,m)− hxwx(x,m)} , (3.12)
respectively, for all (x,m) ∈ R2+. If (c∗, pi∗, h∗) defined by
c∗t := c¯(Xt,Mt), pi
∗
t := p¯i(Xt,Mt), h
∗
t := h¯(Xt,Mt), t ≥ 0, (3.13)
belongs to P and W ∗t := w(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
t ,M
h∗
t ) satisfies (2.12) (with V , c, h replaced by W
∗, c∗,
h∗), then (c∗, pi∗, h∗) optimizes (3.5) and w(x,m) = v(x,m) on R+ × R+.
Proof. (i) Fix (x,m) ∈ R2+. Consider an arbitrary p = (c, pi, h) ∈ P. For any T ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0, T ],
by applying Itoˆ’s formula to w(Xps ,Mhs ), we get
w(XpT ,M
h
T ) = w(X
p
t ,M
h
t ) +
∫ T
t
Lps [w](Xps ,M
h
s )ds+
∫ T
t
σpisX
p
swx(X
p
s ,M
h
s )dBs,
where the operator La,b,d[·] is defined in (3.7). Thanks to (3.10), u 7→ ∫ ut σpisXpswx(Xps ,Mhs )dBs
is a true martingale. Hence, the above equality shows that Ws := w(X
p
s ,Mhs ) is a solution to
BSDE (2.7), with G(ω, s, v) := −Lps(ω)[w](Xps (ω),Mhs (ω)). On the other hand, (3.4) implies that
(c, h) is k-admissible, so that there exists a unique solution V c,h ∈ Ehk to (2.9) that satisfies (2.12)
(Theorem 2.1). Since w is a solution to (3.8), and equivalently to (3.9), we have
F (cs,M
h
s ,Ws) = f(cs,Ws) + (ζ
1−γ − 1)MhsWs ≤ −Lps [w](Xps ,Mhs ). (3.14)
We then conclude from Proposition 2.2 that Wt ≥ V c,ht for all t ≥ 0. In particular, w(x,m) = W0 ≥
V c,h0 . By the arbitrariness of (c, pi, h) ∈ P, w(x,m) ≥ sup(c,pi,h)∈P V c,h0 = v(x,m), as desired.
(ii) Fix (x,m) ∈ R2+. If (c∗, pi∗, h∗) ∈ P, we can repeat the arguments in part (a), obtaining
(3.14) with the inequality replaced by equality. This shows that W ∗t = w(X
c∗,pi∗,h∗
t ,M
h∗
t ) ∈ Eh
∗
k
is a solution to (2.9). Also, (3.4) implies that (c∗, h∗) is k-admissible, so that there is a unique
solution V c
∗,h∗ ∈ Eh∗k to (2.9) satisfying (2.12) (Theorem 2.1). As W ∗ also satisfies (2.12), we
must have W ∗t = V
c∗,h∗
t for all t ≥ 0; particularly, w(x,m) = W ∗0 = V c
∗,h∗
0 . With w(x,m) ≥
sup(c,pi,h)∈P V
c,h
0 = v(x,m) in part (a), we conclude w(x,m) = v(x,m) and (c
∗, pi∗, h∗) ∈ P is an
optimal control.
3.2 Reduction to an Ordinary Differential Equation
If we assume heuristically that wxx < 0, wm < 0, g is differentiable, and the inverse of g
′ is
well-defined, then the optimizers stated in Theorem 3.1 (ii) can be uniquely determined as
c¯(x,m) = δψ
[(1− γ)w(x,m)]ψ(1− 1θ )
wx(x,m)ψ
, p¯i(x,m) = − µ
σ2
wx(x,m)
xwxx(x,m)
,
h¯(x,m) = (g′)−1
(
− xwx(x,m)
mwm(x,m)
)
.
(3.15)
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Plugging these into (3.8) yields
0 =
δψ
ψ − 1
[(1− γ)v(x,m)]ψ(1− 1θ )
vx(x,m)ψ−1
− δθv(x,m)− 1
2
(µ
σ
)2 vx(x,m)2
vxx(x,m)
+ rxvx(x,m) + βmvm(x,m)
+ (ζ1−γ − 1)mv(x,m)−mvm(x,m) sup
h∈R+
{
g(h) +
hxvx(x,m)
mvm(x,m)
}
. (3.16)
Using the ansatz w(x,m) = δθ x
1−γ
1−γ u(m)
− θ
ψ , the above equation reduces to
0 = u(m)2 − c˜0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m) +mu′(m) sup
h∈R+
{
g(h)− (ψ − 1) u(m)
mu′(m)
h
}
, m > 0, (3.17)
where
c˜0(m) := ψδ + (1− ψ)
(
(ζ1−γ − 1)m
1− γ + r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2)
. (3.18)
Moreover, the maximizers in (3.15) now become
c¯(x,m) = xu(m), p¯i ≡ µ
γσ2
, h¯(m) = (g′)−1
(
(ψ − 1) u(m)
mu′(m)
)
. (3.19)
These maximizers indeed characterize optimal consumption, investment, and healthcare spending,
as will be shown in the next section.
4 The Main Results
In this section, we present the main results progressively: Section 4.1 deals with the simplest
case with neither aging nor healthcare; Section 4.2 handles the scenario with aging but without
healthcare, which serves as a baseline for the general model with both aging and healthcare in
Section 4.3.
Let us now formulate the set P of permissible strategies (c, pi, h) in the optimization problem
(3.3). First, take k ∈ R in Definition 2.2 to be
k∗ := δψ + (1− ψ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2)
, (4.1)
so that Λ ∈ R in Definition 2.2 becomes
Λ∗ := δθ + (1− θ)k∗ = δγψ + (1− γψ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2)
. (4.2)
Definition 4.1. Let P1 the set of strategies (c, pi, h) such that (c, pi, h) ∈ Hk∗, (Xc,pi,h)1−γ satisfies
(2.11) (with Λ ∈ R therein taken to be Λ∗) as well as E[ sups∈[0,t] pis(Xc,pi,hs )1−γ] <∞ for t ≥ 0.
Let P2 be defined as P1, except that the second part of (2.11) is replaced by
lim
t→∞ e
−Λ∗tE
[
e
−ηγ(ψ−1) 1−ζ1−γ
1−γ
∫ t
0 M
h
s ds(Xc,pi,ht )
1−γ
]
= 0, for some η ∈ (1− 1γ , 1). (4.3)
Definition 4.2. The set of permissible strategies (c, pi, h), denoted by P, is defined as follows.
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(i) For the case β = 0 and g ≡ 0 (i.e. with neither aging nor healthcare), P := P1;
(ii) For the case β > 0 (i.e. with aging),
P :=
{
P1, if γ ∈
(
1
ψ , 1
)
or ζ = 1,
P2, if γ > 1 and ζ ∈ (0, 1),
Remark 4.1. When there is aging (β > 0), for the case γ > 1 and ζ ∈ (0, 1), we need (Xc,pi,h)1−γ
to satisfy the slightly stronger condition (4.3) (than the transversality condition in (2.11)), so that
the general verification Theorem 3.1 can be applied; see Appendix B.2 for details.
4.1 Neither Aging nor Healthcare
When the natural growth rate of mortality is zero (β = 0) and healthcare is unavailable (g ≡ 0),
the mortality process is simply constant, i.e. Mt ≡ m. Consequently, in the HJB equation (3.8),
the derivatives in m should all vanish; moreover, as v(x,m) is nondecreasing in x by definition,
the second supremum in (3.8) should also be zero. Corresponding to this largely simplified HJB
equation, (3.17) reduces to
0 = u(m)2 − c˜0(m)u(m),
which directly implies u(m) = c˜0(m). The problem (3.5) can then be solved explicitly.
Proposition 4.1. Assume β = 0 and g ≡ 0. For any m ≥ 0, if c˜0(m) defined in (3.18) is strictly
positive, then
v(x,m) = δθ
x1−γ
1− γ c˜0(m)
− θ
ψ for x > 0.
Furthermore, c∗t := c˜0(m)Xt, pi∗t :=
µ
γσ2
, and h∗t := 0, for t ≥ 0, form an optimal control for (3.5).
Proof. See Section B.1.
Proposition 4.1 shows that in the absence of aging and healthcare, the optimal investment rate
is the classical Merton’s proportion, while the optimal consumption rate is the constant c˜0(m),
dictated by the fixed mortality m. By (3.18), for the case ζ = 1, c˜0(m) ≡ ψδ+(1−ψ)
(
r+ 12γ
(µ
σ
)2 )
no longer depends on m. Indeed, when there is no loss of wealth (and thus utility) at death, dying
sooner or later (i.e. how large m is) does not make a difference to an agent who maximizes lifetime
utility plus bequest utility at death. Note that for the specific case ψ = 1/γ, Proposition 4.1 reduces
to [14, Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 4.1] under time-separable utilities.
As ζ
1−γ−1
1−γ < 0 for all 0 < γ 6= 1, we observe from (3.18) that a larger mortality rate m induces
a larger consumption rate due to EIS ψ > 1. This can be explained by the usual substitution effect
in response to negative wealth shocks: a larger mortality rate encourages the agent to consume
more (i.e. consumption substitutes for saving) before the loss of wealth at death.
4.2 Aging without Healthcare
When the natural growth of mortality is positive (β > 0) but healthcare is unavailable (g ≡ 0),
the mortality grows exponentially, i.e. Mt = me
βt, consistently with the Gompertz law. Thanks
to g ≡ 0 and v(x,m) being nondecreasing in x by definition, the second supremum in the HJB
equation (3.8) vanishes. Corresponding to this, (3.17) reduces to
0 = u(m)2 − c˜0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m), m > 0. (4.4)
The next result shows that this type of differential equations can be solved explicitly.
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Lemma 4.1. Fix q > 0, and define the function uq : R+ → R+ by
uq(m) :=
(
1
q
∫ ∞
0
e
ψ−1
q(1−γ) (ζ
1−γ−1)my
(y + 1)
−
(
1+ k
∗
q
)
dy
)−1
. (4.5)
If k∗ in (4.1) is strictly positive, then uq is the unique solution to the ordinary differential equation
0 = u2(m)− c˜0(m)u(m)− qmu′(m), ∀m > 0, (4.6)
such that limq→0 uq(m) = c˜0(m). Moreover, uq satisfies
(a) uq(0) = c˜0(0) = k
∗ > 0, limm→∞ [uq(m)− (c˜0(m) + q)] = 0, and
c˜0(m) < uq(m) < c˜0(m) + q, ∀m > 0. (4.7)
(b) u′q(0+) =∞, u′q(∞) = (ψ − 1)1−ζ
1−γ
1−γ .
Proof. As the results follow from analogous arguments in [14], we only sketch the proof. First,
similarly to (A.8) in [14], (4.6) admits the general solution
u(m) = qe
ψ
θq
(ζ1−γ−1)m
(
Cβm
k
β +
∫ ∞
1
e
ψ
θq
(ζ1−γ−1)mv
v
−(1+ k
q
)
dv
)−1
, with C ∈ R.
To ensure limq→0 u(m) = c˜0(m), we need C = 0, which identifies the corresponding solution as
uq(m) = qe
ψ
θq
(ζ1−γ−1)m
(∫ ∞
1
e
ψ
θq
(ζ1−γ−1)mv
v
−(1+ k
q
)
dv
)−1
.
A straightforward change of variable then gives the formula (4.5). Now, replacing the positive
constants δ+(γ−1)rγ , β, and
1−ζ1−γ
γ in [14, Lemma A.1] by k
∗, q, and −ψ−11−γ (ζ1−γ − 1) in our setting,
we immediately obtain the remaining assertions.
Relying on Lemma 4.1, the problem (3.5) can be solved.
Proposition 4.2. Assume β > 0 and g ≡ 0. If k∗ defined in (4.1) is strictly positive, then
v(x,m) = δθ
x1−γ
1− γ uβ(m)
− θ
ψ , (x,m) ∈ R2+,
where uβ : R+ → R+ is defined as in (4.5), with q = β. Furthermore, c∗t := uβ(meβt)Xt, pi∗t := µγσ2 ,
and h∗t := 0, for t ≥ 0, form an optimal control for (3.5).
Proof. See Section B.3.
Proposition 4.2, together with Lemma 4.1, admits interesting implications. First, we note from
(3.18) and (4.1) that
c˜0(m) = k
∗ + (ψ − 1)(1− ζ
1−γ)m
1− γ . (4.8)
As ψ > 1 and 1−ζ
1−γ
1−γ > 0 for all 0 < γ 6= 1, the condition k∗ > 0 ensures c˜0(m) > 0 for all m > 0.
This, together with uβ > c˜0 ((4.7) with q = β), shows that k
∗ > 0 in Proposition 4.2 is essentially a
well-posedness condition, which guarantees that the optimal consumption rate uβ(me
βt) is strictly
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positive for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, with q = β, Lemma 4.1 (a) stipulates that aging enlarges consump-
tion rate, but the increase does not exceed the growth of aging β > 0; in addition, this upper bound
is asymptotically reached as mortality increases indefinitely. Note that the increase in consumption
results from the same substitution effect as discussed below Proposition 4.1. Lemma 4.1 (b) further
describes how the optimal consumption rate increases with mortality: as the agent is young (i.e. m
is small), it increases steeply; as the agent is old (i.e. m is large), it grows asymptotically linearly,
with the same slope (ψ − 1)1−ζ1−γ1−γ as in the case without aging.
Note that for the specific case ψ = 1/γ, Proposition 4.2 reduces to [14, Proposition 3.2 and
Theorem 4.1] under time-separable utilities.
4.3 Aging and Healthcare
For the general case where the natural growth of mortality is positive (β > 0) and healthcare is
available (g 6≡ 0), we need to deal with the equation (3.17) in its full complexity. To this end, we
impose the following condition on g.
Assumption 1. Let g : R+ → R+ be twice differentiable with g(0) = 0, g′(h) > 0 and g′′(h) < 0
for h > 0, and satisfies the Inada condition
g′(0+) =∞ and g′(∞) = 0, (4.9)
as well as
g (I (ψ − 1)) < β with I := (g′)−1. (4.10)
Condition (4.10) was first introduced in [14]. Its purpose will be made clear after the optimal
healthcare spending strategy h∗ is introduced in Theorem 4.1; see Remark 4.2.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If k∗ in (4.1) is strictly positive, there exists a unique
nonnegative, strictly increasing, strictly concave, classical solution u∗ : R+ → R+ to (3.17). Fur-
thermore, define
β := β − sup
h≥0
{g(h)− (ψ − 1)h} ∈ (0, β).
Then,
uβ(m) ≤ u∗(m) ≤ min{uβ(m), c˜0(m) + β} ∀m > 0, (4.11)
and limm→∞
[
u∗(m)− (c˜0(m) + β)
]
= 0.
Proof. Replacing the positive constants 1−γγ ,
δ+(1−γ)r
γ , and
1−ζ1−γ
γ in [14, Appendix A.3] (particu-
larly Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 therein) by ψ−1, k∗, and −ψ−11−γ (ζ1−γ−1) in our setting, we immediately
get the desired results.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If k∗ in (4.1) is strictly positive, then
v(x,m) = δθ
x1−γ
1− γ u
∗(m)−
θ
ψ , (x,m) ∈ R2+, (4.12)
where u∗ : R+ → R+ is the unique nonnegative, strictly increasing, strictly concave, classical
solution to (3.17). Furthermore, (c∗, pi∗, h∗) defined by
c∗t := u
∗(Mt)Xt, pi∗t :=
µ
γσ2
, h∗t := (g
′)−1
(
(ψ − 1) u
∗(Mt)
Mt(u∗)′(Mt)
)
, t ≥ 0
is an optimal control for (3.5).
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Proof. See Section B.2.
Theorem 4.1 identifies the marginal efficacy of optimal healthcare spending, g′(h∗t ), to be in-
versely proportional to m(u
∗)′(m)
u∗(m) , the elasticity of consumption with respect to mortality, where
the constant of proportionality depends on EIS ψ. Note that a larger EIS implies less healthcare
spending, as (g′)−1 is strictly decreasing. In a sense, healthcare spending is like saving: it crowds
out current consumption, but potentially enlarges future consumption by extending one’s lifetime.
Since a larger EIS means a stronger substitution effect (as discussed below Proposition 4.1), one
substitutes more consumption for saving-like healthcare spending with a larger ψ.
Although the optimal consumption rate u∗(m), the solution to (3.17), does not admit an explicit
formula, it does have simple upper and lower bounds thanks to (4.11). The lower bound is uβ(m),
the consumption rate in a model where healthcare is unavailable, but mortality grows at the lower
rate β < β, low enough that the agent would be willing to give up access to healthcare in exchange
for such a slower natural growth of mortality. The upper bound is the minimum between the
consumption rate in the case of aging without healthcare (i.e. uβ(m) in Section 4.2), and the
consumption rate in the case of neither aging nor healthcare (i.e. c˜0(m) in Section 4.1) plus the
adjusted growth rate β. These bounds for u∗ are crucial for verification arguments in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, as well as the calibration in Section 5.
Note that for the specific case ψ = 1/γ, Theorem 4.1 reduces to [14, Theorems 3.4 and 4.1]
under time-separable utilities.
Remark 4.2. As the same argument in [14, Lemma A.2] implies u
∗(m)
m(u∗(m))′ ≥ 1 for m > 0,
g(h∗t ) = g
(
I
(
(ψ − 1) u
∗(Mt)
Mt(u∗)′(Mt)
))
≤ g(I(ψ − 1)) < β, (4.13)
where the last inequality is due to (4.10). In other words, (4.10) stipulates that optimizing healthcare
spending can only reduce, but not reverse, the growth of mortality.
Remark 4.3. Since the transferred wealth at death is ζXc
∗,pi∗,h∗
τ− , (4.12) indicates that the resulting
bequest utility is
δθ
(ζXc
∗,pi∗,h∗
τ− )1−γ
1− γ u
∗(Mh
∗
τ−)
− θ
ψ = ζ1−γv(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
τ− ,M
h∗
τ−),
i.e. the loss of wealth at death reduces utility by a factor of ζ1−γ, confirming the setup in (2.6).
5 Calibration and Implications
In this section, we calibrate the model in Section 4.3 to mortality data in various countries. We
focus on examining (i) whether our model properly explains the change of mortality over time, and
(ii) the shape of the efficacy function g and its implications to a country’s healthcare quality.
We take as given the following values: r = 1%, δ = 3%, ψ = 1.5, γ = 2, ζ = 50%, µ = 5.2%, and
σ = 15.4%. A safe rate of r = 1% approximates the long-term average real rate on Treasury bills
reported in [4], and the time preference δ = 3% is also consistent with estimates therein; ψ = 1.5
corresponds to the estimate obtained in [3]; γ = 2 follows the specification in [21] and [36]; market
parameters µ = 5.2% and σ = 15.4% are taken from the long-term estimates in [19]; ζ = 50% is
a rough estimate of inheritance and estate taxes in developed countries. Note that these values
ensure k∗ > 0 in (4.1). On the other hand, the efficacy function g : R+ → R+ is taken to be
g(z) = a
zq
q
, with a > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1). (5.1)
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The equation (3.17) then becomes
u2(m)− c˜0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m) + 1− q
q
a
1
1−q ((ψ − 1)u(m)) −q1−q (mu′(m)) 11−q = 0, (5.2)
and the optimal healthcare spending process h∗ is now given by
h∗t =
(
a−1(ψ − 1) u
∗(Mt)
Mt(u∗)′(Mt)
) −1
1−q
,
where u∗ is the unique solution to (5.2). The endogenous mortality is then
dMt = Mt
(
β − 1
q
a
1
1−q
(
(ψ − 1) u
∗(Mt)
Mt(u∗)′(Mt)
) −q
1−q
)
dt, M0 = m0 > 0. (5.3)
We calibrate β > 0, a > 0, q ∈ (0, 1), and m0 > 0 to mortality data in the US, the UK,
the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. For each country, the natural growth rate of mortality β > 0 is
estimated from mortality data for the cohort born in 1900, assuming no healthcare available. Given
this estimated β > 0, healthcare parameters a > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1) in (5.1), as well as the initial
mortality m0 > 0, are calibrated by matching the endogenous mortality curve (5.3) with mortality
data for the cohort born in 1940, through minimizing the mean squared error (MSE). Calibration
results are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 Calibration Results
Country β (%) m0 × 104 a q Model MSE ×106 MSE ×106
United States (US) 7.24069 1.34995 0.19 0.61 0.0436896 0.128984
United Kingdom (UK) 7.79605 0.843827 0.19 0.60 0.0249924 0.12755
Netherlands (NL)* 8.65832 0.477551 0.16 0.53 0.0478583 0.207779
Bulgaria (BG)** 8.86593 0.892038 0.14 0.56 0.923716 2.85819
* Mortality rates impacted during WWII were excluded when calculating β.
** Incomplete data for the 1900 cohort. β estimated from age range 47-77.
Our calibration can potentially be improved in a few directions. First, we take advantage of the
upper and lower bounds in (4.11) to approximate the solution u∗ to (5.2), instead of solving (5.2)
directly. There are nontrivial challenges in solving (5.2) numerically: the natural initial condition
u(0) = 0 leads to multiple solutions; to resolve this, our investigation suggests enforcing Neumann
boundary conditions u′(0) = ∞ and u′(∞) = 0, and solving (5.2) via a sequential approximation
technique. This is computationally taxing, even for a fixed pair of parameters (a, q). As the
calibration needs to explore numerous possibilities of (a, q), we do not proceed with this approach.
Despite this, an efficient numerical scheme for solving (5.2), if developed, is likely to improve the
accuracy of our calibration. Second, we use a grid size of 0.01 for the search of optimal (a, q). A
finer grid might allow for better distinction between countries (such as the US and UK).
5.1 Mortality
Figure 1 presents the model performance under two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that the cohort born in 1900 essentially had no access to healthcare, so that its mortality grew
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exponentially with the Gompertz law. The blue line is then obtained simply by linearly regressing
actual mortality data (the blue dots). Second, we assume that the cohort born in 1940 had full
access to healthcare. We then compare the model-implied mortality (the red curve) with actual
mortality date (the red dots). Although these assumptions are crude approximations, they are in
place due to several realistic considerations, as explained in [14, Section 5.2].
It is confirmed in Figure 1 that our model has the ability to reproduce declines in mortality that
are very close to the ones observed historically. Moreover, when compared with [14, Figure 5.2],
Figure 1 clearly provides a better fit. This improvement can be attributed to the use of Epstein-Zin
utilities (so that γ and ψ can both take empirically relevant values), the inclusion of risky assets,
modifications of calibration methods, or a combination of all three.
The success of our model is not limited to the US data. Figure 3 evaluates the model perfor-
mance using mortality data in the UK, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. In all cases, the model-
implied mortality (the red line) desirably approximates actual mortality data (the red dots).
Another way to evaluate the performance of our model is to compare it with linear regression.
Indeed, without any idea of healthcare, one can model the actual mortality of the 1940 cohort by a
simple linear regression (as we did for the 1900 cohort). As shown in the last two columns of Table
1, our model outperforms linear regression significantly, across all countries considered. Specifically,
the sixth column of Table 1 reports the MSEs under our model, much smaller than those under
linear regression in the seventh column.
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Figure 3: Mortality rates (vertical axis, in logarithmic scale) at adults’ ages for the cohorts born
in 1900 and 1940 in three countries. The dots are actual mortality data (Source: Berkeley Human
Mortality Database), and the lines are model-implied mortality curves.
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5.2 Healthcare Spending
Figure 4 demonstrates the model-implied optimal healthcare spending in the four countries. The
left panel shows that the proportion of wealth spent on healthcare is negligible at age 40, but
increases quickly to around 0.5-1% at age 80. This is in line with the finding in [14, Section 5.1]
under time-separable utilities, and broadly consistent with the US data reported in [17]. The
right panel further shows that as one gets older, healthcare spending increases much faster than
consumption and investment combined: it accounts for less than 5% of total spending at age 40,
but increases continuously to 13-30% at age 80.
Figure 4: Optimal healthcare spending in the US, UK, Netherlands (NL), and Bulgaria (BG).
Left panel: Healthcare-wealth ratio (vertical, log-scale) at adult ages (horizontal). Right panel:
Healthcare as a fraction of total spending in consumption, investment, and healthcare (vertical) at
adult ages (horizontal).
For the US, UK, and Netherlands, healthcare-spending ratios reported above are in broad agree-
ment with actual healthcare expenditure as a percentage of GDP, as displayed in Figure 5. Bulgaria
is distinctively different: model-implied healthcare-spending ratios largely outsize its healthcare
expenditure as a percentage of GDP at 8.4%. This might indicate that Bulgaria’s healthcare
expenditure is less than optimal, while a detailed empirical investigation is certainly needed here.
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Figure 5: Life expectancy v.s. healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP (2017) for countries in
OECD and European Union (Source: OECD Health Statistics Database and [24]).
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5.3 The Efficacy Function g
Figure 2 presents the calibrated efficacy function g(h) = ah
q
q for each of the four countries. Intrigu-
ingly, it indicates a ranking among countries in term of the effectiveness of healthcare spending:
across realistic levels of spending (0-30% of wealth), healthcare is more effective (in reducing mor-
tality growth) in the Netherlands than in the UK, in the UK than in the US, and in the US than
in Bulgaria. This leads to two important observations.
First, this ranking of efficacy, together with healthcare spending illustrated in Figure 4, reveals
that lower efficacy of healthcare is compensated by larger healthcare spending, relative to both
total wealth and total spending. In other words, in the face of enhanced efficacy, our model simply
stipulates less healthcare spending, instead of more to take advantage of the reduced marginal cost
to curtail mortality growth.
Second, this model-implied ranking of efficacy is in broad agreement with empirical studies on
healthcare across countries. A common measure of the effectiveness of healthcare spending in a
country is life expectancy versus healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP. Figure 5 presents such
data for numerous countries, and the black line represents the average effectiveness of healthcare.
The Netherlands is further away above the average than the UK, while the US and Bulgaria are
two outliers below average. This is generally consistent with the ranking in Figure 2.
Certainly, there are more comprehensive, multifaceted measures of healthcare. Tandon et al.
[33], recently rated by [29] as the most reproducible and transparent ranking of healthcare systems,
evaluated healthcare across countries based on quality of care, access to care, efficiency, equity, and
general healthiness of citizens. Among the 191 countries evaluated, the Netherlands, the UK, the
US, and Bulgaria ranked number 17, 18, 37, and 102, respectively. This is again in line with the
ranking suggested by Figure 2.
A Proofs for Section 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
In view of (2.3) and (2.1), for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s, it holds for P¯-a.e. ω¯ = (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω¯ that
P¯(τ > ` | Fs ∨Ht)(ω¯) = e−
∫ `
t M
h
u (ω)du1{τ>t}(ω¯), ∀t ≤ ` ≤ s. (A.1)
Also, since V˜ is a G-adapted semimartingale, it follows from (2.4) that there exists an F-adapted
semimartingale V such that
V˜t = Vt P¯-a.s. on {t < τ}, ∀t ≥ 0. (A.2)
Indeed, for any fixed ω ∈ Ω, consider At(ω) := {ω′ ∈ Ω′ : t < τ(ω, ω′)} for all t ≥ 0. As V˜ is
G-adapted, (2.4) implies V˜t(ω, ω′) is constant P′-a.s. on At(ω). By defining Vt(ω) = V˜t(ω,At(ω)) for
all t ≥ 0, V is an F-adapted semimartingale satisfying (A.2). Also note that E[sups∈[0,t] |Vs|] <∞,
18
as E¯[sups∈[0,t] |V˜s|] <∞, for all t ≥ 0. Now, observe that
E¯
[∫ T∧τ
t∧τ
f(cs, V˜
c,h
s )ds
∣∣∣∣ Gt] = E¯ [∫ T
t
1{s<τ}f(cs, V˜ c,hs )ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht]
=
∫ T
t
E¯
[
1{s<τ}f(cs, V˜ c,hs )
∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht] ds
=
∫ T
t
E¯
[
E¯
[
1{s<τ}f(cs, V c,hs ) | Fs ∨Ht
] ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht] ds
=
∫ T
t
E¯
[
f(cs, V
c,h
s ) E¯
[
1{s<τ} | Fs ∨Ht
] ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht] ds
=
∫ T
t
E¯
[
f(cs, V
c,h
s )1{t<τ}e
− ∫ st Mhudu ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht] ds
= E¯
[∫ T
t
1{t<τ}e−
∫ s
t M
h
uduf(cs, V
c,h
s )ds
∣∣∣∣ Gt] , (A.3)
where the second and the last equalities follow from Fubini’s theorem for conditional expectations
(see e.g. [27, Theorem 27.17]), the third equality is due to the tower property of conditional
expectations and (A.2), the fourth equality results from cs ∈ Fs and V c,hs ∈ Fs, and the fifth
equality is a consequence of (A.1). On the other hand, for P¯-a.e. fixed ω¯ = (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω¯, consider
the cumulative distribution function of τ given the information FT ∨Ht, i.e.
F (s) := P¯(τ ≤ s | FT ∨Ht)(ω¯), s ≥ 0.
Thanks to (A.1), F (s) = 1− e−
∫ s
t M
h
u (ω)du1{τ>t}(ω¯) for t ≤ s ≤ T . The density function of τ given
the information FT ∨Ht is then
η(s) = F ′(s) = Mhs (ω)e
− ∫ st Mhu (ω)du1{τ>t}(ω¯), for t ≤ s ≤ T. (A.4)
It follows that
E¯
[
V˜ c,hτ− 1{τ≤T}
∣∣∣ Gt] = E¯ [V c,hτ− 1{τ≤T} ∣∣∣ Gt]1{τ≤t} + E¯ [V c,hτ− 1{τ≤T} ∣∣∣ Gt]1{τ>t}
= V c,hτ− 1{τ≤t} + E¯
[
E¯
[
V c,hτ− 1{t<τ≤T} | FT ∨Ht
] ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht]
= V c,hτ− 1{τ≤t} + E¯
[∫ T
t
1{t<τ}Mhs e
− ∫ st MhuduV c,hs ds
∣∣∣∣ Gt] , (A.5)
where the first line results from V˜τ− = Vτ− (thanks to (A.2)), the second line follows from the tower
property of conditional expectations, and the third line is due to the density formula in (A.4). Note
that since V is right-continuous, it has at most countably many jumps on [t, T ], so that we may
use Vs (instead of Vs−) in the last term of (A.5). Finally,
E¯
[
V˜ c,hT 1{τ>T}
∣∣∣ Gt] = E¯ [E¯[V c,hT 1{τ>T} | FT ∨Ht] ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht]
= E¯
[
V c,hT E¯
[
1{τ>T} | FT ∨Ht
] ∣∣∣ Ft ∨Ht]
= E¯
[
1{t<τ}e−
∫ T
t M
h
uduV c,hT
∣∣∣ Gt] , (A.6)
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where the first equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectations and (A.2),
the second equality is due to V c,hT ∈ FT , and the third equality is a consequence of (A.1). Now,
combining (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6), we obtain from (2.6) and V˜τ− = Vτ− that
V˜ c,ht = Et
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, V
c,h
s ) + ζ
1−γMhs V
c,h
s
)
ds+ e−
∫ T
t M
h
s dsV c,hT
]
1{t<τ}
+ ζ1−γV c,hτ− 1{t≥τ}, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞, (A.7)
where we use the notation Et [·] = E [·|Ft]. This, together with (A.2), particularly implies
Vt(ω)1{t<τ}(ω,ω′) = V˜t(ω, ω′)1{t<τ}(ω,ω′) = Et,T (ω)1{t<τ}(ω,ω′), (A.8)
where
Et,T (ω) := Et
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, V
c,h
s ) + ζ
1−γMhs V
c,h
s
)
ds+ e−
∫ T
t M
h
s dsV c,hT
]
(ω).
For any ω ∈ Ω, since there exists ω′ ∈ Ω′ such that 1{t<τ}(ω,ω′) = 1 (in view of (2.3) and (2.1)), we
conclude from (A.8) that Vt(ω) = Et,T (ω). We can then simplify (A.7) as
V˜t = Vt1{t<τ} + ζ1−γVτ−1{t≥τ}, (A.9)
where V satisfies
Vt = Et
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, Vs) + ζ
1−γMhs Vs
)
ds+ e−
∫ T
t M
h
s dsVT
]
, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞ (A.10)
Now, note that the above equation directly implies
V ′t := e
− ∫ t0 Mhr drVt =M ′t −
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
0 M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, Vs) + ζ
1−γMhs Vs
)
ds,
where
M ′t := Et
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 M
h
r dr
(
f(cs, Vs) + ζ
1−γMhs Vs
)
ds+ e−
∫ T
0 M
h
s dsVT
]
is an F-martingale on [0, T ], thanks to (A.10). Applying generalized Itoˆ’s formula for semimartin-
gales (see [20, Theorem I.4.57]) to Vt = e
∫ t
0 M
h
r drV ′t gives
dVt = −F (ct,Mht , Vt) + e
∫ t
0 M
h
r drdM ′t .
Since 0 ≤ Mht ≤ meβt by definition (see (2.2)), Mt :=
∫ t
0 e
∫ s
0 M
h
r drdM ′s is again an F-martingale.
Hence, V is a solution to BSDE (2.9). This, together with (A.9), yields the desired result.
A.2 Derivation of Proposition 2.2
Recall the generator F defined in (2.10).
Lemma A.1. Let c, h, V and W be F-progressively measurable processes with Ws ≤ Vs for all s ≥ 0.
If there exists k ∈ R such that V satisfies (2.12), then
F (cs,M
h
s , Vs)− F (cs,Mhs ,Ws) ≤ −Γ(Λ,Mhs )(Vs −Ws), (A.11)
where Λ := δθ + (1− θ)k (as in Definition 2.2) and the function Γ is defined by
Γ(λ,m) := λ+
γ(ψ − 1)
1− γ (1− ζ
1−γ)m. (A.12)
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Proof. As in the proof of [23, Lemma B.1], (A.11) holds by the mean value theorem provided that
Fv(cs,M
h
s , u) ≤ −Γ(Λ,Mhs ) for all u ∈ [Ws, Vs]. To this end, note that
Fv(cs,M
h
s , u) = −
(
δθ + (1− ζ1−γ)Mhs + δ(1− θ)
(
c1−γs
(1− γ)u
)1/θ)
.
Thanks to (1.1), a direct calculation shows Fvv(cs,M
h
s , u) > 0, i.e. Fv(cs,M
h
s , u) is increasing
in u. This, together with V satisfying (2.12), implies that for all u ∈ [Ws, Vs], Fv(cs,Mhs , u) ≤
Fv(cs,M
h
s , uˆ), where uˆ := δ
θ
(
k − ψ−11−γ (ζ1−γ − 1)Mhs
)−θ c1−γs
1−γ . By direct calculation,
Fv(cs,M
h
s , uˆ) = −
(
δθ + (1− ζ1−γ)Mhs + (1− θ)
(
k − ψ − 1
1− γ (ζ
1−γ − 1)Mhs
))
= −
(
Λ +
γ(ψ − 1)
1− γ (1− ζ
1−γ)Mhs
)
= −Γ(Λ,Mhs ),
where the second equality follows from the definition of Λ and θ = 1−γ1−1/ψ .
To prove Proposition 2.2, we intend to follow the idea in the proof of [23, Theorem 2.2]. The
involvement of the controlled mortality Mh in (2.11), as well as the possibility that Λ therein can
be negative (Remark 2.4), result in additional technicalities. The proof below combines arguments
in [23, Theorem 2.2] and [11, Theorem 2.1], adapted to weaker regularity of processes.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Recall the function Γ in (A.12). Fix 0 ≤ t0 < T , define
∆t := e
− ∫ tt0 Γ(0,Mhs )ds (V 1t − V 2t ) , t ∈ [t0, T ], (A.13)
and consider the stopping time θ := inf
{
s ≥ t0 : V 1s ≤ V 2s
}
. Applying generalized Itoˆ’s formula
(see [20, Theorem I.4.57]) to e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsV it , i = 1, 2, yields
d
(
e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsV 1t
)
= −e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )ds
[
Γ(0,Mhs )V
1
t + F (ct,M
h
t , V
1
t )
]
dt+ e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsdM 1t ,
d
(
e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsV 2t
)
= −e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )ds
[
Γ(0,Mhs )V
2
t +G(t, V
2
t )
]
dt+ e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsdM 2t ,
whereM 1,M 2 are some F-martingales on [0, T ]. As 0 ≤ Γ(0,Mht ) ≤ γ(ψ−1)1−γ (1− ζ1−γ)meβt by the
definition of Mh in (2.2), the processes
∫ ·
t0
e−
∫ t
0 Γ(0,M
h
s )dsdM it is a true martingales for i = 1, 2. It
follows that
∆t = Et
[∫ T
t
1{s<θ}
[(
F (cs,M
h
s , V
1
s )−G(s, V 2s )
)
+ Γ(0,Mhs )
(
V 1s − V 2s
)]
e
− ∫ st0 Γ(0,Mhr )drds+ ∆T∧θ
]
.
Observe that
1{s<θ}
(
F (cs,M
h
s , V
1
s )−G(s, V 2s )
)
= 1{s<θ}
(
F (cs,M
h
s , V
1
s )− F (cs,Mhs , V 2s )
)
+ 1{s<θ}
(
F (cs,M
h
s , V
2
s )−G(s, V 2s )
)
≤ 1{s<θ}
(
F (cs,M
h
s , V
1
s )− F (cs,Mhs , V 2s )
)
≤ 1{s<θ}
(
−Γ(Λ,Mhs )
(
V 1s − V 2s
))
,
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where the first inequality follows from F (cs,M
h
s , V
2
s ) ≤ G(s, V 2s ), and the second inequality is due
to Lemma A.1. Note that Lemma A.1 is applicable here as V 1s > V
2
s for s ∈ [t, θ). Thanks to the
above inequality,
∆t ≤ Et
[∫ T
t
1{s<θ}
[
−Γ(Λ,Mhs ) + Γ(0,Mhs )
] (
V 1s − V 2s
)
e
− ∫ st0 Γ(0,Mhr )drds+ ∆T∧θ
]
= Et
[
−
∫ T
t
1{s<θ}Λ∆sds+ ∆T∧θ
]
, (A.14)
where the second line follows from Γ(Λ,Mhs ) = Λ + Γ(0,M
h
s ) and (A.13). Multiplying both sides
by 1{t<θ} yields
∆t1{t<θ} ≤ Et
[
−
∫ T
t
Λ∆s1{s<θ}ds+ ∆T∧θ1{t<θ}
]
≤ Et
[
−
∫ T
t
Λ∆s1{s<θ}ds+ ∆T1{T<θ}
]
,
where the second inequality follows from the right continuity of V 1 and V 2: indeed, the right
continuity implies V 1θ ≤ V 2θ , so that ∆T∧θ = ∆θ1{θ≤T} + ∆T1{T<θ} ≤ ∆T1{T<θ}. By defining
∆+t = ∆t1{t<θ}, we write the previous inequality as
∆+t ≤ Et
[
−
∫ T
t
Λ∆+s ds+ ∆
+
T
]
. (A.15)
Now, consider Θt := E
[
∆+t
] ≥ 0, which is well-defined as Γ(0,Ms) ≥ 0 and E[ supt∈[0,T ] |V it |] <∞,
thanks to V i ∈ Ehk (Definition 2.2), for i = 1, 2. We then obtain from (A.15) that
Θt ≤ −
∫ T
t
ΛΘsds+ ΘT . (A.16)
If Λ > 0, by writing ΘT ≥ Θt +
∫ T
t ΛΘsds, we apply standard Gronwall’s inequality to get ΘT ≥
Θte
∫ T
t Λds, or equivalently
Θt ≤ ΘT e−
∫ T
t Λds, t ∈ [t0, T ]. (A.17)
If Λ < 0, applying backward Gronwall’s inequality (see [35, Proposition 2]) to (A.16) also gives
(A.17). By (A.17), (A.13), and (A.12), we obtain
Θt0 ≤ ΘT e−
∫ T
t0
Λds ≤ E
[
e
− ∫ Tt0 Γ(Λ,Ms)ds (|V 1T |+ |V 2T |)] . (A.18)
Since T > 0 is arbitrary, the transversality condition in (2.11) for V 1t and V
2
t immediately implies
0 ≤ Θt0 ≤ lim
T→∞
E
[
e
− ∫ Tt0 Γ(Λ,Ms)ds (|V 1T |+ |V 2T |)] = 0. (A.19)
That is, Θt0 = E
[(
V 1t0 − V 2t0
)
1{t0<θ}
]
= 0. This entails θ = t0, and thus V
1
t0 ≤ V 2t0 . Since t0 ≥ 0 is
arbitrary, we conclude that V 1t ≤ V 2t for all t ≥ 0.
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B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
For any fixed m > 0 such that c˜0(m) > 0, define w(x) := δ
θ x1−γ
1−γ c˜0(m)
− θ
ψ for all x > 0. In order
to apply Theorem 3.1 to our setting, we need to verify all its conditions. First, it can be checked
directly that w, as a one-variable function, solves (3.8) in a trivial way, with derivatives with respect
to m in (3.8) all being zero. For any (c, pi, h) ∈ P = P1, since (Xc,pi,h)1−γ satisfies (2.11) (with
Λ ∈ R therein taken to be Λ∗), so does w(Xc,pi,ht ); namely, w(Xc,pi,ht ) ∈ Ehk∗ . Also, by the definitions
of P and w, P = P1 ⊆ Hk∗ and (3.10) is satisfied. As c˜0(m) > 0, wx > 0 and wxx < 0 by
definition. It follows that c¯(x,m) := xc˜0(m) and p¯i(x,m) :=
µ
γσ2
are the unique maximizers of the
two supremums in (3.11), respectively. Note that the supremum in (3.12) is zero, as g ≡ 0 and
wx > 0. Hence, h¯(x,m) := 0 trivially maximizes (3.12). Now, the only condition in Theorem 3.1
that remains to be checked is “(c∗, pi∗, h∗) defined in (3.13) belongs to P and W ∗t := w(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
t )
satisfies (2.12)”.
To this end, observe that a unique solution X∗ = Xc∗,pi∗,h∗ to (3.2) exists, which is a geometric
Brownian motion satisfying the dynamics
dX∗t = X
∗
t
(
r +
1
γ
(µ
σ
)2 − c˜0(m)) dt+X∗t µγσdBt, (B.1)
This implies that
(X∗t )
1−γ = x1−γexp
(
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − c˜0(m)− (1− γ)
2γ2
(µ
σ
)2)
t+
(1− γ)µ
γσ
Bt
)
, (B.2)
which is again a geometric Brownian motion that satisfies the dynamics
dYt
Yt
= (1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − c˜0(m)) dt+ (1− γ)µ
γσ
dBt, Y0 = x
1−γ .
Consequently,
e−Λ
∗tE
[
e
−γ(ψ−1) 1−ζ1−γ
1−γ mt(X∗t )
1−γ
]
= x1−γe(C−Λ
∗)t, (B.3)
where
C := (1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − c˜0(m))− γ(ψ − 1)1− ζ1−γ
1− γ m.
Remarkably, by the definitions of c˜0(m) and Λ
∗ in (3.18) and (4.2), a direct calculation shows that
C − Λ∗ = −c˜0(m) < 0, where the inequality follows from c˜0(m) > 0. It follows from (B.3) that
lim
t→∞ e
−Λ∗tE
[
e
−γ(ψ−1) 1−ζ1−γ
1−γ mt(X∗t )
1−γ
]
= 0. (B.4)
On the other hand, we can rewrite (B.2) as
(X∗t )
1−γ = x1−γexp
(
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − c˜0(m)) t) · Zt, (B.5)
where Z is a geometric Brownian motion with the dynamics dZt = Zt
(1−γ)µ
γσ dBt, Z0 = 1. As Z is
a martingale, we can apply the Burkho¨lder-Davis-Gundy inequality to get
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
(X∗s )
1−γ
]
≤ Kx1−γe
(
|1−γ|
∣∣∣r+ 12γ (µσ )2−c˜0(m)∣∣∣)t |1− γ|µ
γσ
E
[(∫ t
0
Z2sds
)1/2]
, (B.6)
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for some constant K > 0. By Jensen’s inequality and Fubini’s theorem,
E
[(∫ t
0
Z2sds
)1/2]
≤
(∫ t
0
E[Z2s ]ds
)1/2
=
(∫ t
0
e
(1−γ)2µ2
γ2σ2
s
ds
)1/2
=
γσ
|1− γ|µ
(
e
(1−γ)2µ2
γ2σ2
t − 1
)1/2
.
We then conclude from the above two inequalities that
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
(X∗s )
1−γ
]
<∞, ∀t ≥ 0. (B.7)
By (B.4) and (B.7), (X∗)1−γ satisfies (2.11) (with Λ∗ in place of Λ), and so does the process
W ∗t := w(X∗t ) = δθ c˜0(m)
− θ
ψ
(X∗t )1−γ
1−γ , i.e. W
∗ ∈ Eh∗k∗ . Now, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to W ∗t and
using the fact
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
pi∗s(X
∗
s )
1−γ
]
<∞ for all t ≥ 0, (B.8)
which is a direct consequence of (B.7) and pi∗t ≡ µγσ2 being a constant process, we can argue as in
the proof of Theorem 3.1 that W ∗t is a solution to (2.9). Moreover, by direct calculation,
W ∗t = δ
θ c˜0(m)
−θ+(1−γ) (X∗t )1−γ
1− γ = δ
θ c˜0(m)
−θ (c∗t )1−γ
1− γ
As c˜0(m) = k
∗+ (ψ− 1)1−ζ1−γ1−γ m (see (4.8)), this shows that (2.12) is satisfied with k = k∗. Hence,
(c∗, h∗) is k∗-admissible, so that we can conclude (c∗, pi∗, h∗) ∈ P. Theorem 3.1 is then applicable
to our setting, asserting that w(x,m) = v(x,m) and (c∗, pi∗, h∗) optimizes (3.5).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Define w(x,m) := δθ x
1−γ
1−γ u
∗(m)−
θ
ψ for all (x,m) ∈ R2+. In order to apply Theorem 3.1 to our
setting, we need to verify all its conditions. First, w ∈ C2,1(R+ × R+) by definition and it can be
checked, as in (3.15)-(3.17), that w solves (3.8). In view of the definitions of P and w, P ⊆ Hk∗ and
(3.10) is satisfied for any (c, pi, h) ∈ P. Moreover, as wx > 0, wxx < 0, and g satisfies Assumption 1,
the functions c¯, p¯i, and h¯ in (3.19) are unique maximizers of the supermums in (3.11) and (3.12).
In the following, we focus on showing (i) for any (c, pi, h) ∈ P, w(Xc,pi,ht ,Mht ) ∈ Ehk∗ ; (ii) (c∗, pi∗, h∗),
defined using c¯, p¯i, and h¯ as in (3.13), belongs to P and W ∗t := w(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
t ,M
h∗
t ) satisfies (2.12).
(i) Take any p = (c, pi, h) ∈ P, and set Wt := w(Xpt ,Mht ) for t ≥ 0. We will prove that W ∈ Ehk∗ ,
i.e. W satisfies (2.11) with Λ therein taken as Λ∗ in (4.2).
• Case (i)-1: γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1). In view of (4.11), (3.18), and (4.1), we have u∗(m) ≥ c˜0(m) ≥ c˜0(0) =
k∗ > 0. As θ > 0 when γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1), this implies
0 < Wt = δ
θ (X
p
t )
1−γ
1− γ u
∗(Mht )
− θ
ψ ≤ δθ (X
p
t )
1−γ
1− γ (k
∗)−
θ
ψ ∀t ≥ 0,
Since (Xp)1−γ satisfies (2.11) (thanks to p ∈ P = P1), the above inequality implies that W
also satisfies (2.11).
• Case (i)-2: γ > 1 and ζ < 1. As p ∈ P = P2, there exists η ∈ (1− 1γ , 1) such that (4.3) holds.
Consider the constants
α := −ηγ(ψ − 1)
1− γ (ζ
1−γ − 1) > 0, α′ := −(1− η)γ(ψ − 1)
1− γ (ζ
1−γ − 1) > 0, (B.9)
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as well as the process
Ft :=
(
uβ(M
h
t )
)− θ
ψ
exp
(
−α′
∫ t
0
Mhs ds
)
, t ≥ 0. (B.10)
First, we claim that the process F is bounded from above; more specifically,
sup
t≥0
Ft ≤ uβ
(
− θ
α′ψ
β
)−θ/ψ
<∞. (B.11)
Observe that
dFt
dt
= −
(
α′Mht +
θ
ψ
uβ(M
h
t )
−1u′β(M
h
t )
dMht
dt
)
Ft
= −
(
α′Mht +
θ
ψβ
(β − g(ht))
[
uβ(M
h
t )− c˜0(Mht )
])
Ft, (B.12)
where the second equality follows as uβ solves (4.6) with q = β. For each ω ∈ Ω, consider the
collection of time points
S(ω) :=
{
t ≥ 0 : Mht (ω) =
−θ
α′ψβ
(β − g(ht))
(
uβ(M
h
t )− c˜0(Mht )
)
(ω)
}
.
We deduce from (B.12) that
local maximizers of t 7→ Ft(ω) must occur at time points in S(ω). (B.13)
Also, by g ≥ 0 and (4.7),
Lt(ω) :=
−θ
α′ψβ
(β − g(ht))
(
uβ(M
h
t )− c˜0(Mht )
)
(ω) ≤ − θ
α′ψ
β, ∀t ≥ 0. (B.14)
This particularly implies that
Mht (ω) = Lt(ω) ≤ −
θ
α′ψ
β, for each t ∈ S(ω). (B.15)
Now, there are three distinct possibilities: 1) There exists t∗ ≥ 0 such that Mht (ω) < Lt(ω)
for all t > t∗. Then, S(ω) ⊆ [0, t∗] and (B.14) implies Mht (ω) < − θα′ψβ for all t > t∗. It then
follows from (B.13) and (B.10) that
sup
t≤t∗
Ft(ω) = sup
t∈S(ω)
Ft(ω) ≤ sup
t∈S(ω)
uβ
(
Mht (ω)
)− θ
ψ ≤ uβ
(
− θ
α′ψ
β
)−θ/ψ
, (B.16)
where the last inequality follows from (B.15). Moreover,
sup
t>t∗
Ft(ω) ≤ sup
t>t∗
uβ
(
Mht (ω)
)− θ
ψ ≤ uβ
(
− θ
α′ψ
β
)−θ/ψ
.
Hence, (B.11) holds. 2) There exists t∗ ≥ 0 such that Mht (ω) > Lt(ω) for all t > t∗. By (B.12),
Ft(ω) is strictly decreasing for t > t
∗. Thus, supt≥0 Ft(ω) = supt≤t∗ Ft(ω) = supt∈S(ω) Ft(ω).
Thanks to the estimate in (B.16), we conclude that (B.11) holds. 3) Neither 1) nor 2) above
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holds. This implies sup{t ≥ 0 : t ∈ S(ω)} =∞. Hence, supt≥0 Ft(ω) = supt∈S(ω) Ft(ω), so that
(B.11) holds thanks again to the estimate in (B.16).
Now, since u∗ ≤ uβ (see (4.11)), −θ/ψ > 0, and 1− γ < 0, we have
0 ≥ e
γ(ψ−1)
1−γ (ζ
1−γ−1) ∫ t0 Mhs dsWt ≥ δθ (uβ(Mht ))−θ/ψ e γ(ψ−1)1−γ (ζ1−γ−1) ∫ t0 Mhs ds (Xpt )1−γ1− γ
= δθFt e
−α ∫ t0 Mhs ds (Xpt )1−γ
1− γ ≥ δ
θuβ
( −θ
α′ψ
β
)−θ/ψ
e−α
∫ t
0 M
h
s ds
(Xpt )
1−γ
1− γ ,
where the equality follows from (B.10) and (B.9), and the last inequality is due to (B.11).
Recalling that p ∈ P = P2, we conclude from (4.3) and the above inequality that
lim
t→∞ e
−Λ∗tE
[
e
γ(ψ−1)
1−γ (ζ
1−γ−1) ∫ t0 Mhs dsWt
]
= 0.
On the other hand, since Mht ≤ meβt,
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Wt|
]
≤ δ
θ
|1− γ|uβ(me
βt)−θ/ψE
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
(Xps )
1−γ
]
<∞, ∀t ≥ 0.
where the finiteness is a direct consequence of p ∈ P.
• Case (i)-3: γ > 1 and ζ = 1. In view of (4.5), uq ≡ k∗ > 0 for any q > 0. It then follows
from (4.11) that u∗ ≡ k∗ > 0. The required properties then follow directly from p ∈ P = P1.
(ii) Now, we show that (c∗, pi∗, h∗) ∈ P and W ∗t := w(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
t ,M
h∗
t ) satisfies (2.12). Observe
that a unique solution M∗ = Mh∗ to (2.2) exists. As h∗ by definition only depends on u∗, g, and
the current mortality rate, M∗ is a deterministic process. Moreover, t 7→ M∗t is strictly increasing
thanks to (4.13). On the other hand, a unique solution X∗ = Xc∗,pi∗,h∗ to (3.2) exists, which admits
the explicit formula
(X∗t )
1−γ = x1−γ exp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − (u∗(Mh∗s ) + h∗s)− (1− γ)2γ2 (µσ)2
)
ds
+
(1− γ)µ
γσ
Bt
)
. (B.17)
• Case (ii)-1: γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1). As M∗t is strictly increasing, u∗(M∗t ) ≥ u∗(m) ≥ c˜0(m), where the
second inequality follows from (4.11) and (4.7). With this and h∗t ≥ 0, we deduce from (B.17)
that (B.2) holds with “=” therein replaced by “≤”. As k∗ > 0 entails c˜0(m) > 0 (see (4.8)),
the same arguments in Proposition 4.1 can be applied to to show that (X∗)1−γ satisfies (2.11).
With this, we can argue as in Case (i)-1 to show that W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) belongs to Eh
∗
k∗ .
• Case (ii)-2: γ > 1 and ζ 6= 1. As u∗ solves (3.17) and h∗ is the maximizer of the supremum
in (3.17), we have
u∗(M∗t )− c˜0(M∗t )− (ψ − 1)h∗t =
M∗t (u∗)′(M∗t )
u∗(M∗t )
(β − g(h∗t )) > 0 ∀t > 0,
where the inequality follows from g(h∗t ) < β, thanks to (4.10). This gives h∗t <
1
ψ−1(u
∗(M∗t )−
c˜0(M
∗
t )), so that
u∗(M∗t ) + h
∗
t <
ψ
ψ − 1u
∗(M∗t )−
1
ψ − 1 c˜0(M
∗
t ) ≤
ψ
ψ − 1uβ(M
∗
t )−
1
ψ − 1 c˜0(M
∗
t ), (B.18)
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where the last inequality follows from u∗(m) ≤ uβ(m) (see (4.11)). For any η ∈ (1 − 1γ , 1),
consider α, α′ > 0 defined as in (B.9). Observe that uβ(m) can be written as
uβ(m) = β
e
−m ψ
θβ
(1−ζ1−γ) (
m ψθβ (1− ζ1−γ)
)− k∗
β
Γ
(
−k∗β ,m ψθβ (1− ζ1−γ)
)
where Γ is the upper incomplete gamma function given by Γ(s, z) :=
∫∞
z t
s−1e−tdt. Similarly
to the argument in [14, (A.6)-(A.7)], by using the fact lim
z→∞
Γ(s,z)
e−zzs−1 = 1,
lim
m→∞
ψ − 1
ψ
(
α+ (ζ1−γ − 1))m
(γ − 1)uβ(m) =
ψ − 1
ψ
α+ (ζ1−γ − 1)
(ψ − 1)(ζ1−γ − 1) =
α+ (ζ1−γ − 1)
ψ(ζ1−γ − 1) > 1, (B.19)
where the inequality follows from the definition of α and η > 1 − 1γ . This, together with M∗
being a strictly increasing deterministic process, implies the existence of s∗ > 0 such that
(α+ (ζ1−γ − 1))M∗s >
ψ(γ − 1)
ψ − 1 uβ(M
∗
s ) for s > s
∗. (B.20)
Consider the constant
0 ≤ K := max
t∈[0,s∗]
{
ψ
ψ − 1uβ(M
∗
t )−
α+ (ζ1−γ − 1)
γ − 1 M
∗
t
}
<∞.
In view of (B.17), (B.18), and the fact that c˜0(m) = k
∗ + (1− ψ) ζ1−γ−11−γ m (see (4.8)),
e−α
∫ t
0 M
∗
s ds(X∗t )
1−γ
≤ x1−γexp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2
+
k∗
ψ − 1 −
ψ
ψ − 1uβ(M
∗
s )−
α+ (ζ1−γ − 1)
1− γ M
∗
s
)
ds
)
· Zt
≤ x1−γe(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
+ k
∗
ψ−1−K
)
s∗
e
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
+ k
∗
ψ−1
)
(t−s∗)
Zt,
where Zt is the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5), and the second
inequality follows from (B.20). It follows that
e−Λ
∗tE
[
e−α
∫ t
0 M
∗
s ds(X∗t )
1−γ
]
≤ x1−γe
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
+ k
∗
ψ−1−K
)
−Λ∗
)
s∗
e
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
+ k
∗
ψ−1
)
−Λ∗
)
(t−s∗)
= x1−γe
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
+ k
∗
ψ−1−K
)
−Λ∗
)
s∗
e
−(γ+ γ−1
ψ−1 )k
∗(t−s∗) → 0 as t→∞,
where the equality follows from a direct calculation using the definition of Λ∗ in (4.2), and the
convergence is due to k∗ > 0. Namely, X∗ satisfies (4.3). On the other hand, by (B.18) and
M∗t ≤ meβt, we obtain from (B.17) that
(X∗t )
1−γ ≤ x1−γexp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − ψ
ψ − 1uβ(me
βs)
)
ds
)
· Zt,
where Z is again the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5). By the
Burkho¨lder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we obtain the estimate in (B.6) with −c˜0(m) therein
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replaced by ψψ−1uβ(me
βt). This then implies E
[
sups∈[0,t](X∗s )1−γ
]
< ∞, by the inequality
preceding (B.7).
Finally, under E
[
sups∈[0,t](X∗s )1−γ
]
<∞ and (4.3), the same argument as in Case (i)-2 shows
that W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) belongs to Eh
∗
k∗ .
• Case (ii)-3: γ > 1 and ζ = 1. By (4.5), uβ(m) ≡ k∗ > 0. As M∗t is strictly increasing,
c˜0(M
∗
t ) ≥ c˜0(0) = k∗. The estimate (B.18) then becomes u∗(M∗t ) + h∗ ≤ ψψ−1k∗− 1ψ−1k∗ = k∗,
so that we can deduce from (B.17) that
(X∗t )
1−γ ≤ x1−γexp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − k∗ − (1− γ)
2γ2
(µ
σ
)2)
ds+
(1− γ)µ
γσ
Bt
)
.
The arguments in Proposition 4.1 can then be applied to show that (X∗)1−γ satisfies (2.11).
Then, we may argue as in Case (i)-3 to show that W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) belongs to Eh
∗
k∗ .
Finally, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to W ∗t and using the fact (B.8), which is a direct consequence of
(B.7) and pi∗t ≡ µγσ2 being a constant process, we can argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that W ∗t
is a solution to (2.9). Moreover, by direct calculation
W ∗t = δ
θu∗(M∗t )
−θ+(1−γ) (X∗t )1−γ
1− γ = δ
θu∗(M∗t )
−θ (c∗t )1−γ
1− γ ≤ δ
θ c˜0(M
∗
t )
−θ (c∗t )1−γ
1− γ ,
where the inequality follows from u∗ ≥ c˜0 (see (4.11) and (4.7)) and the fact that θ > 0 if γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1)
and θ < 0 if γ > 1. This shows that W ∗ satisfies (2.12) with k = k∗. Hence, (c∗, h∗) is k∗-admissible,
and we can now conclude that (c∗, pi∗, h∗) belongs to P. By Theorem 3.1, v(x,m) = w(x,m) for
all (x,m) ∈ R2+ and (c∗, pi∗, h∗) optimizes (3.5).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Define w(x,m) := δθ x
1−γ
1−γ uβ(m)
− θ
ψ for all (x,m) ∈ R2+. In order to apply Theorem 3.1 to our
setting, we need to verify all its conditions. First, w ∈ C2,1(R+ × R+) by definition and it can be
checked directly that w solves (3.8), as uβ is a solution to (4.4) (by Lemma 4.1). In view of the
definitions of P and w, P ⊆ Hk∗ and (3.10) is satisfied for any (c, pi, h) ∈ P. By following part
(i) of the proof of Theorem 4.1, we immediately have w(Xc,pi,ht ,M
h
t ) ∈ Ehk∗ for any (c, pi, h) ∈ P
(The proof is actually simpler here, as Mht = me
βt in the current setting). Moreover, as wx > 0,
wxx < 0, c¯(x,m) := xuβ(m) and p¯i(x,m) :=
µ
γσ2
are the unique maximizers of the two supremums
in (3.11), respectively. Note that the supremum in (3.12) is zero, as g ≡ 0 and wx > 0. It follows
that h¯(x,m) := 0 trivially maximizes (3.12). It remains to show that (c∗, pi∗, h∗), defined using c¯,
p¯i, and h¯ as in (3.13), belongs to P and W ∗t := w(Xc
∗,pi∗,h∗
t ,M
h∗
t ) satisfies (2.12).
Observe that Mh
∗
t = me
βt as h∗ ≡ 0, and a unique solution X∗ = Xc∗,pi∗,h∗ to (3.2) exists,
which satisfies the dynamics (B.1) with c˜0(m) replaced by uβ(me
βt). This implies
(X∗t )
1−γ = x1−γexp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − uβ(meβs)− (1− γ)
2γ2
(µ
σ
)2)
ds+
(1− γ)µ
γσ
Bt
)
.
(B.21)
• Case 1: γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1). As 1 − γ > 0 and uβ(m) ≥ c˜0(m) (see (4.7)), we deduce from (B.21)
that (B.2) holds with “=” therein replaced by “≤”. As k∗ > 0 entails c˜0(m) > 0, the same
arguments in Proposition 4.1 can be applied to show that (X∗)1−γ satisfies (2.11). With this,
we can argue as in Case (i)-1 of the proof of Theorem 4.1 to obtain W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) ∈ Eh
∗
k∗ .
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• Case 2: γ > 1 and ζ 6= 1. For any η ∈ (1− 1γ , 1), consider the constant α > 0 defined in (B.9).
Similarly to (B.19), using the fact that limz→∞
Γ(s,z)
e−zzs−1 = 1 yields
lim
m→∞
αm
(γ − 1)u˜(m) =
α
(ψ − 1)(ζ1−γ − 1) > 1. (B.22)
where the inequality follows from the definition of α and η > 1 − 1γ . This implies that there
exists some s∗ > 0 such that
αmeβs ≥ (γ − 1)u˜(meβs) for all s ≥ s∗. (B.23)
Consider the constant
0 ≤ K := max
t∈[0,s∗]
{
u˜(meβt)− αme
βt
γ − 1
}
<∞.
Now, as Mt = me
βt, we deduce from (B.21) that
e−α
∫ t
0 Msds(X∗)1−γ
= x1−γ exp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − uβ(meβs)− αmeβs
(1− γ)
)
ds
)
· Zt
≤ x1−γe(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2−K
)
s∗
e
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
)
(t−s∗)
Zt,
where Zt is the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5), and the inequality
follows from (B.23). It follows that
e−Λ
∗tE
[
e−α
∫ t
0 Msds(X∗t )
1−γ
]
≤ x1−γe
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2−K
)
−Λ∗
)
s∗
e
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2
)
−Λ∗
)
(t−s∗)
= x1−γe
(
(1−γ)
(
r+ 1
2γ (
µ
σ )
2−K
)
−Λ∗
)
s∗
e−γk
∗(t−s∗) → 0, as t→∞,
where the second line follows from a direct calculation using the definition of Λ∗ in (4.2), and
the convergence is due to k∗ > 0. On the other hand, similarly to (B.5), we rewrite (B.21) as
(X∗t )
1−γ = x1−γexp
(∫ t
0
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2 − uβ(meβs)) ds) · Zt,
where Z is again the driftless geometric Brownian motion defined below (B.5). By Burkho¨lder-
Davis-Gundy’s inequality, we obtain the estimate in (B.6) with −c˜0(m) therein replaced by
uβ(me
βt). This then implies E
[
sups∈[0,t](X∗s )1−γ
]
<∞, by the inequality preceding (B.7).
Under E
[
sups∈[0,t](X∗s )1−γ
]
<∞ and (4.3), the same argument as in Case (i)-2 of the proof of
Theorem 4.1 shows that W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) belongs to Eh
∗
k∗ .
• Case 3: γ > 1 and ζ = 1. By (4.5), uβ(m) ≡ k∗ > 0. Then, in view of (B.21), we can apply
the same arguments as in Proposition 4.1 to show that (X∗)1−γ satisfies (2.11). With this, we
may argue as in Case (i)-3 in the proof of Theorem 4.1 to obtain W ∗t := w(X∗t ,M∗t ) ∈ Eh
∗
k∗ .
Finally, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to W ∗t and using the fact (B.8), which is a direct consequence of
(B.7) and pi∗t ≡ µγσ2 being a constant process, we can argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that W ∗t
is a solution to (2.9). Moreover, by direct calculation
W ∗t = δ
θuβ(M
∗
t )
−θ+(1−γ) (X∗t )1−γ
1− γ = δ
θuβ(M
∗
t )
−θ (c∗t )1−γ
1− γ ≤ δ
θ c˜0(M
∗
t )
−θ (c∗t )1−γ
1− γ ,
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where the inequality follows from uβ ≥ c˜0 (see (4.7)) and the fact that θ > 0 if γ ∈ ( 1ψ , 1) and
θ < 0 if γ > 1. This shows that W ∗ satisfies (2.12) with k = k∗. Hence, (c∗, h∗) is k∗-admissible,
and we can now conclude that (c∗, pi∗, h∗) belongs to P. By Theorem 3.1, v(x,m) = w(x,m) for
all (x,m) ∈ R2+ and (c∗, pi∗, h∗) optimizes (3.5).
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